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Abstract
We identify several new tractable subsets and several new intractable simple cases for reasoning
in the propositional version of Reiter’s default logic. The majority of our findings are related to brave
reasoning. By making some intuitive observations, most classes that we identify can be derived quite
easily from some subsets of default logic already known in the literature. Some of the subsets we
discuss are subclasses of the so-called “extended logic programs”. All the tractable subsets presented
in this paper can be recognized in linear time.  2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Reiter’s default logic [14] is one of the leading formalisms known in Artificial
Intelligence for nonmonotonic reasoning. It has been used for declarative representations
of problems in a variety of areas, including diagnostic reasoning [15], theory of speech acts
[12], natural language processing [11], and inheritance hierarchies with exceptions [4]. In
addition, it has been shown that logic programs with classical negation and with so-called
“negation by default” can be embedded very naturally in default logic, and thus default
logic can provide semantics for logic programs [3,7].
However, while knowledge can be specified in a natural way in default logic, the
complexity of answering basic queries on knowledgebases expressed in propositional
default logic is very high (p2 or 
p
2 -complete [8,17]). Even for very simple propositional
default theories, the problem is NP-hard [10,16]. Hence, identifying subsets of default
logic in which reasoning can be done relatively easily is an important task. This paper
makes contributions along these lines.
E-mail address: rachel@bgumail.bgu.ac.il (R. Ben-Eliyahu-Zohary).
0004-3702/02/$ – see front matter  2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
PII: S0004-3702(02) 00 18 9- 3
2 R. Ben-Eliyahu-Zohary / Artificial Intelligence 139 (2002) 1–20
In this work, we focus on disjunction-free propositional default logic. The rules in this
logic are precisely those that can be expressed as extended logic programs clauses. Several
researchers have presented complexity results on subsets of this class, e.g., [2,10,16]. In
the work of Kautz and Selman [10], for example, tractable subsets for default logic were
identified for the case where W is a set of literals. In such cases, the conclusions derived
from the defaults cannot be used for generating more knowledge from W because W is
only a set of literals. The first question we ask is: can we make the subsets identified
by [10] more general? In other words, under which conditions can we divide the process
of extension generation into two phases: computing all the observations (namely, literals)
entailed by W , and then, ignoring W and computing all the conclusions derived using
the defaults and the observations alone? We found out that this is possible whenever new
conclusions obtained by the defaults cannot generate new facts from W . We set conditions
that guarantee this situation and achieved a line of new complexity results derived using
subclasses identified in the past.
The other question we had was about subclasses identified in the past which had a strong
bias towards a particular literal sign (the sign being “positive” or “negative”). For example,
in [10], it was shown that when W is a set of unit clauses and D a set of Horn rules, there
exists a linear algorithm which determines if a given literal appears in some extension of
(D,W). Horn rules are defaults where the prerequisites is a conjunction of positive literals.
The question we raise is: If D is a set of dual-Horn rules, that is, the prerequisite of each
default is a conjunction of negative literals, do we still get a tractable subset?
As another example, it was shown by [10] that when W is a set of unit clauses and D
a set of normal unary defaults, we can decide whether a literal belongs to every extension
of the theory in quadratic time. In unary defaults, the prerequisite is a single positive
literal. Thus, we ask: can we define tractable default theories with negative literals as
prerequisites?
Intuitively, and correctly, the answer to the above questions seems to be “yes”. In
general, if we take a class of disjunction-free default theories and we reverse the sign
of all literals in the defaults and all the literals in W , we get a “dual” subset that lies in the
same complexity class as the original. This is an easy consequence of the “Dual Theorem”
presented in this paper. As a corollary of the Dual Theorem, we obtain a line of complexity
results for default logic, derived from classes that have previously been identified in the
literature. The Dual Theorem can also be used as a tool in future studies for discovering
more complexity classes of default logic.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we survey some definitions and subsets
that appear in past works, and in Section 3 we present the new subclasses that we have
identified. Section 4 concludes with diagrams of all the unique new subsets that this paper
is the first to introduce.
2. Preliminary definitions and known results
We begin with a brief introduction to the propositional version of Reiter’s default
logic [14], which is followed by some complexity results on default logic published in
the past and relevant to this paper.
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2.1. Reiter’s default logic
Let L be a propositional language over a countable alphabet. A default theory is a pair
∆= (D,W), where D is a set of defaults and W is a set of well-formed formulas (wff) in
L. A default is a rule of the form
α : β1, . . . , βn
γ
, (1)
where α,β1, . . . , βn, and γ are formulas in L.1
A default δ can also be written using the syntax α : β1, . . . , βn/γ . α is called the
prerequisite (pre(δ)); β1, . . . , βn are the justifications (just(δ)); and γ is the conclusion
(concl(δ)). The intuition behind a default can be stated as “If I believe α and I have no
reason to believe that one of the βi ’s is false, then I can believe γ ”. A default α : β/γ is
normal if γ = β .
The set of defaults D induces an extension on W . Intuitively, an extension is a maximal
set of formulas that is deducible from W using the defaults in D. Let E∗ denote the logical
closure of E in L. We use the following definition of an extension, which is a restriction
of Theorem 2.1 of Reiter for the propositional finite case [14]:
Definition 2.1 (Extension). Let E ⊆ L be a set of wffs, and let (D,W) be a finite
propositional default theory. Define
(1) E0 =W , and
(2) for i  0, Ei+1 = E∗i ∪ {γ | α : β1, . . . , βk/γ ∈D where α ∈ Ei and ¬β1, . . . ,¬βk /∈
E}.
E is an extension for (D,W) iff for some n > 0 E =En =En−1. (Note the appearance of
E in the formula for Ei+1.)
A default theory (D,W) is called consistent if W is consistent. Many tasks on a default
theory (D,W) may be formulated using one of the following queries:
Coherence: Does (D,W) have an extension?
Membership: Given a literal l, is l contained in some extension of (D,W)?
Entailment: Given a literal l, is l contained in every extension of (D,W)?
It has been shown that for the class of propositional default logics the coherence problem
is P2 -complete and membership and entailment for the class of normal propositional
default theories are P2 -complete and 
P
2 -complete, respectively [8,17]. Ben-Eliyahu
and Dechter have shown that for the subclass of propositional default theories which
they call “2-DT”, membership and coherence is NP-complete while entailment is co-NP-
complete [2]. The class 2-DT is the class of default theories where W and the prerequisite
1 Empty justifications are equivalent to the identically true proposition true [13].
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of each default is 2-CNF; the conclusion of each default is a clause of size two; and each
of the prerequisites is 2-DNF (that is, a disjunction of conjunctions of two literals).
Throughout this paper we assume that W is a finite set of clauses and D is a finite set of
disjunction-free defaults. That is, the precondition, justification, and consequence of each
default is a conjunction of literals. We will assume, without loss of generality for the class
of disjunction-free defaults, that each default has a single literal as a conclusion.
A clause is a disjunction of literals. A literal is an atom (positive literal) or a negation of
an atom (negative literal). We will often treat a clause as a set of literals. A CNF formula
is a conjunction of clauses, and thus can be represented as a set of clauses, or in our
representation, as a set of sets. An x-CNF formula is a CNF formula with at most x literals
in each clause. A Horn clause is a clause with at most one positive literal. A Horn clause
is definite if it has exactly one positive literal. A bi-Horn formula is a 2-CNF formula in
which in each clause there is exactly one positive and exactly one negative literal.
Several subclasses of default logic have been identified in the literature. In this paper
we look at the dual of them.
Definition 2.2 (Dual). The dual of a CNF formula α is denoted by dual(α). The dual of a
literal is the literal with the same atom but with an opposite sign. Therefore dual(P ) is ¬P
and dual(¬P) is P . The dual of a clause is the disjunction of the duals of all the literals in
the clause. The dual of a CNF formula is the conjunction of the duals of its clauses. The
dual of a set of clauses is the set of all duals of the clauses in the set. The dual of a default
rule α : β1, . . . , βn/γ is dual(α) : dual(β1), . . . ,dual(βn)/dual(γ ).
Example 2.3. The dual of P ∨ ¬Q ∨ S is ¬P ∨ Q ∨ ¬S. The dual of P∧¬Q :¬R∧S¬R is¬P∧Q :R∧¬S
R
.
A set of clauses is dual-Horn if in each clause there is at most one negative literal. A set
of clauses is definite dual-Horn if in each clause there is exactly one negative literal.
Some of the tractable subsets we identify are subsets of ordered default theories [4].
The following definition is from [10].
Definition 2.4 (Ordered default theory). Given a semi-normal disjunction-free default
theory (D,W), and a set of literals L containing all the literals in the theory, define ≺ and
 to be the smallest relations over L×L such that (the sign “\” below is set-difference):
• ≺ and  are transitive.
• ≺ is transitive through , that is, for literals x, y , and z in L,[
(x ≺ y ∧ y  z)∨ (x  y ∧ y ≺ z)]→ x ≺ x.
• For every δ ∈D, and every x ∈ pre(δ), y ∈ concl(δ), and z ∈ (just(δ) \ concl(δ)):
x  y and dual(z)≺ y.
Then (D,W) is ordered iff it contains no literal x such that x ≺ x .
The following assertion about the dual of a default theory is pretty straightforward.
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Observation 2.5. Let (D,W) be a disjunction-free default theory. Then (D,W) is ordered
if and only if (dual(D),dual(W)) is ordered.
Later we need the notion of “default proof” for normal default theories [14].
Definition 2.6 (Default proof ; a special case of [14, Definition 3]). Let ∆= (D,W) be a
normal propositional default theory where W is a set of literals and D is disjunction-free,
and let l be a literal. A finite (possibly empty) sequence of defaults δ1, . . . , δk from D is a
default proof of l with respect to ∆ iff
(1) l ∈W ∪ cocl(δk),
(2) for 1 i  k, pre(δi)⊆W ∪ {⋃j<ij=1 concl(δj )},
(3) W ∪ {⋃kj=1 concl(δj )} is consistent.
According to [14, Theorem 4.8], if the default theory ∆ is consistent and normal, then
a literal has a proof with respect to ∆ if and only if it is in some extension of ∆. A default
proof for a literal is minimal if there is no other proof using a smaller number of defaults.
Note that each prefix of a default proof is also a default proof of the literal in the conclusion
of the rule used last in the prefix.
The following subsets of default rules have been identified in previous works [10,
16] and are relevant to this paper. All the subsets of default rules described below are
disjunction-free.
disjunction-free ordered The defaults are ordered.
Horn The literals in the prerequisite are all positive. The justification and conclusion
are the same single literal.
unary The prerequisite is a positive literal and the consequence is a single literal. If the
consequence is negative, the justification must be identical to the consequence.
If the consequence is positive, the justification may include a single additional
negative literal.
normal unary The defaults are unary and the justification is identical to the consequence.
prerequisite-free ordered unary These are ordered and unary defaults with empty
prerequisites.
prerequisite-free positive normal unary These are normal unary defaults where the
conclusion is positive and the prerequisite is empty.
In this paper we are interested in the “duals” of the above subsets. In general, the “duals”
are obtained by taking a class of default theories and reversing the sign of all literals in the
defaults. Following is an explicit definition of the new subclasses discussed in this paper
(compare with the list above).
dual-Horn The literals in the prerequisite are all negative. The justification and conclu-
sion are the same single literal.
dual-unary The prerequisite is a negative literal and the consequence is a single literal. If
the consequence is positive, the justification must be identical to the consequence.
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If the consequence is negative, the justification may include a single additional
positive literal.
normal dual-unary The defaults are dual-unary and the justification is identical to the
consequence.
prerequisite-free ordered dual-unary These are ordered and dual-unary defaults with
empty prerequisites.
prerequisite-free negative normal dual-unary These are normal dual-unary defaults
where the conclusion is negative and the prerequisite is empty.
2.2. Known tractable subsets for default logic
The following tractable subsets for default reasoning have previously been identified
and are relevant to this paper.
(1) Suppose ∆ = (D,W) where W is a set of unit clauses and D is a set of disjunction
free ordered defaults. An extension of ∆ can be found in time O(n3), where n is the
length of ∆ [10].
(2) Suppose∆= (D,W) where W is a set of unit clauses and D a set of Horn rules. There
exists an O(n) algorithm which determines if a given literal appears in some extension
of ∆, where n is the length of ∆ [10].
(3) Suppose ∆ = (D,W) where W is a set of unit clauses and D a set of normal unary
defaults. We can decide whether a literal belongs to every extension of the theory in
time O(n2), where n is the length of ∆ [10].
(4) When W is a set of definite Horn clauses and D a set of Horn defaults, we can decide
in polynomial time whether a negative literal belongs to some extension of (D,W).
(The reasoning for positive literals is NP-complete [18].)
(5) When W is a set of bi-Horn clauses and D a set of Horn defaults, we can decide in
polynomial time whether a literal (negative or positive) belongs to some extension of
(D,W) [18].
2.3. Known negative results on brave reasoning
We next survey some negative results known in the literature which are relevant to this
paper.
The following problems are NP-complete:
(1) Given a default theory ∆ = (D,W) where D is unary and W is a set of literals,
determine whether a literal appears in some extension of ∆ [10].
(2) Given a default theory ∆= (D,W) where W is a set of Horn clauses and D is a set of
prerequisite-free positive normal unary defaults, determine whether a literal appears in
some extension of ∆ [16].
(3) The problem of determining whether a literal appears in some extension of a default
theory ∆ = (D,W) where W is a set of 2-CNF clauses and D a set of normal dual-
unary defaults [16].
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(4) The problem of determining whether a literal appears in some extension of a default
theory ∆= (D,W) where W is a set of 2-CNF clauses and D a set of prerequisite-free
ordered unary defaults [16].
(5) [16] The problem of determining whether a literal appears in some extension of a
default theory ∆= (D,W) where W is a set of literals and D a set of prerequisite-free
ordered unary defaults [16].
(6) The problem of determining whether a negative literal appears in some extension of a
default theory ∆= (D,W) where W is a set of definite Horn clauses and D a set of
Horn defaults [18].
(7) The problem of determining whether a literal appears in some extension of a default
theory ∆ = (D,W) where W is a set of 2-CNF Horn clauses and D a set of Horn
defaults [18].
2.4. A known negative result on cautious reasoning
The problem of determining whether a literal appears in every extension of a default
theory where W is a set of unit clauses and D is Horn is co-NP-complete [10].
2.5. A known negative result on coherence
The problem of determining whether a default theory where D is unary and W is a set
of literals has an extension is NP-complete [10].
In the next section we introduce some new complexity results inspired by the subclasses
mentioned above.
3. New complexity results
We start by introducing a class of default theories where the set of clauses entailed by W
can be replaced in advance, before we apply the defaults, by a set of literals. We call this
class the class of theories having a set of defaults which is ineffectual w.r.t. W , because
conclusions drawn using defaults do not yield more clauses entailed by W .
Definition 3.1 (Ineffectual set of default rules w.r.t. W ). Let ∆ = (D,W) be a default
theory where W is a set of clauses and D a set of unit conclusion defaults. D is ineffectual
w.r.t. W iff whenever a literal is in the conclusion of some rule in D, its negation is not in
any non-unit clause in W .
Note that for any disjunction-free default theory (D,W), if W is a set of literals (or
in other words, unit clauses), then D is ineffectual w.r.t. W . Also, it is clear that we can
decide in linear time whether a set of defaults is ineffectual w.r.t. W .
The first set of tractable theories that we define result from the following claim (the
proof of which is straightforward). Let LW denote the set of all unit clauses (or in other
words, all literals) entailed by W .
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Proposition 3.2. Let (D,W) be a default theory where W is a set of clauses and D a set
of unit conclusion defaults ineffectual w.r.t. W . Then E is an extension of (D,W) iff E is
W∗ ∪E′, where E′ is an extension of (LW ,D).
Tractable classes for disjunction-free default logic were presented in several papers [10,
16]. The preceding proposition hints that those classes can be made more general. In the
following, “a tractable subset” is any subset of CNF formulas known to be tractable with
respect to literal entailment (given a CNF theory T and a literal l—is l true in every model
T ?), e.g., Horn or 2-CNF theories. It is clear that if a propositional theory is tractable, we
can find the set of literals entailed by the theory in polynomial time. In the following, the
length of a default theory is the number of symbols used in specifying it.
Corollary 3.3.
(1) (Following [10], see item (1) in Section 2.2.) Suppose ∆= (D,W) where W belongs
to some tractable subset and D is a set of disjunction free ordered defaults ineffectual
w.r.t. W . An extension of ∆ can be found in time polynomial in the length of ∆.
(2) (Following [10], see item (2) in Section 2.2.) Suppose ∆= (D,W) where W is a set
of clauses which belongs to a tractable subset and D a set of Horn rules ineffectual
w.r.t. W . We can determine in time polynomial in ∆ whether a given literal appears in
any extension of ∆.
(3) (Following [10], see item (3) in Section 2.2.) Suppose ∆= (D,W) where W is a set
of clauses which belongs to a tractable subset, and D a set of normal unary defaults
ineffectual w.r.t. W . We can decide whether a literal belongs to every extension of the
theory in time polynomial in the length of ∆.
The definition of ineffectual defaults is a bit problematic. It implies that in order to
insure that a database is tractable, we need to avoid using defaults with conclusions that
appear negated in the set of facts, or “world description”, W . This restriction prevents us
from separating the process of writing W from the process of writing the defaults. In other
words, using a certain syntax for the defaults will not guarantee tractability. For every
default we write, we will have to check whether the negation of the conclusion is not in a
non-unit clause in the knowledge base W .
Nevertheless, the notion of ineffectual defaults is useful. In many cases, an extension
computed using only a subset of the defaults is a subset of an extension computed using
all the defaults. This is so, for example, when the defaults are normal. In such cases, we
can compute first a subset of the extension using a relevant subset of defaults which are
ineffectual with respect to W . Sometimes answers to the queries on a default theory can
be computed using only a subset of an extension. For example, if we ask a membership
query on a literal and we find out that it is in a subset of some extension, we can answer
“yes” without having to compute all the extensions. Another way to take advantage of this
tractable subset is to incorporate a linear time test in a reasoning system to check whether
a set of defaults is ineffectual, and if so, to use a polynomial algorithm to compute answers
to the appropriate queries.
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The next class we introduce is the class of default theories where W is a tractable set of
clauses and D is a set of smooth non-disjunctive default rules which are ineffectual w.r.t.
W . Intuitively, a set of defaults is smooth if it can never create conflicting extensions.
Definition 3.4 (Smooth set of default rules). A set of unit-conclusion non-disjunctive
default rules is smooth iff it has at least one of the following properties:
(1) Whenever a literal is in the conclusion of some rule in D, its dual is not in the
conclusion of any other rule in D.
(2) Whenever a literal is in the conclusion of some rule in D, its dual is not in the
prerequisite of any other rule in D.
Note that a set of prerequisite-free default rules is smooth. A set of defaults where all the
conclusions are positive literals or all the conclusions are negative literals is also smooth.
The following theorem asserts that if the defaults are smooth and ineffectual w.r.t. W ,
then once we have the set of all literals entailed by W , we can solve the membership
problem quite easily. This theorem will lead to the recognition of more tractable subsets
for the membership problem. If W belongs to a tractable subset, we can compute LW , the
set of literals entailed by W , in polynomial time.
Theorem 3.5. Let l be a literal and let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory where W is a set
of clauses and D is a set of smooth disjunction-free normal defaults ineffectual w.r.t. W .
Then we can decide in time linear in LW and D whether l belongs to at least one of ∆’s
extensions.
Proof. First, we explain some notation used in the proof. Where l is a literal, l′ is equal to
l when l is a positive literal, and l′ is a new atom Pl if l is a negative literal. Given a set of
literals L, we define L′ to be {l′ | l ∈L}. Clearly, L′ is a set of positive literals.
We can now continue with the proof. If W is inconsistent, then l is in the (inconsistent)
extension of ∆. W is inconsistent if and only if LW contains a literal and its negation. This
can be checked in linear time and hence the theorem holds in the case W is inconsistent.
From now on we assume W is consistent.
Let l be a literal and let ∆ = (D,W) be a default theory where W is a set of clauses
and D is a set of smooth disjunction-free normal defaults ineffectual w.r.t. W . Define
∆∗ = (LW ,D), and define H∆ to be (LW)′ ∪ {a′1 ∧ · · · ∧ a′n → b′ | a1∧···∧an :bb ∈ D and
dual(b) is not in LW }. Note that H∆ is a definite Horn theory.
Claim 3.6. l is in at least one extension of ∆∗ iff l′ is entailed by H∆.
Suppose l belongs to some extension E of ∆∗. Then there must be a sequence
s = δ1,. . . , δn of rules from D which is a proof of l w.r.t. ∆∗. Let c1, . . . , cn be a sequence
of definite Horn clauses, defined as follows: Suppose δi (1  i  n), is of the form
a1∧···∧ak :b
b
. We define ci to be a′1∧· · ·∧ a′k → b′. Since s is a proof with respect to ∆∗ and
LW is consistent, it must be the case that dual(b) /∈ LW . Hence ci belongs to H∆. We claim
that c1, . . . , cn is a classical logic proof of l′ from (LW )′. The proof is by induction on n.
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Case n= 0: In this case l is in LW and so l′ is in (LW )′ by definition.
Case n > 0: Let δn be a1∧···∧ak :bb and let cn be a
′
1 ∧ · · · ∧ a′k → b′. By the definition of
a default proof, a1, . . . , ak have proofs w.r.t. ∆∗ using δ1, . . . , δn−1. The length
of these proofs must be shorter than n. Hence by the induction hypothesis,
c1, . . . , cn−1 can be used to prove a′1, . . . , a′k from H∆. Then clearly c1, . . . , cn
can be used to prove l′ from (LW)′.
For the other direction, assume c1, . . . , cn is a minimal classical logic proof of
l′ from H∆. For each ci (1  i  n) of the form a′1 ∧ · · · ∧ a′k → b′ define δi to
be a1∧···∧ak :b
b
. We will show that the following holds:
(1) l ∈ LW ∪ concl(δn),
(2) For 1 i  n, pre(δi)⊆ LW ∪ {⋃j<ij=1 concl(δj )},
(3) LW ∪ {⋃nj=1 concl(δj )} is consistent.
This will establish the claim that l has a default proof w.r.t. ∆∗, and thus, by [14,
Theorem 4.8], l is in some extension of ∆∗. Item (1) clearly holds because l is
the conclusion of δn. It is also easy to see that item (2) holds. It is left to prove
item (3), that is, to prove that LW ∪ {⋃nj=1 concl(δj )} is consistent. The proof is
by induction on n. Let b denote concl(δn).
Case n= 1: By definition of H∆.
Case n > 1: By the induction hypothesis, LW ∪ {⋃n−1j=1 concl(δj )} is consistent.
Assume by contradiction that for some 1  i < n, dual(b) is entailed
by LW ∪ {⋃ij=1 concl(δj )}. By definition of H∆, b must be consistent
with LW , so dual(b) is not in LW and hence it must be the case that for
some j  i , concl(δj ) is dual(b). Since D is a smooth set of defaults,
and condition (1) of Definition 3.4 is not fulfilled, it must be the case
that there is no rule in D in which dual(b) appears in the preconditions.
So cj must be redundant in the proof of l′, because it is used to prove an
atom that is never used further in the proof. This is a contradiction to the
minimality of the proof of l′ from H∆.
Once we have proven the above claim, it is clear that we can decide in time linear in LW
and D whether l belongs to at least one of ∆∗’s extensions. By Proposition 3.2, l belongs
to one of the extensions of ∆ if and only if l belongs to one of the extensions of ∆∗. Hence
the proof is complete. ✷
The complexity classes introduced below result from the Dual Theorem. This theorem
establishes an intuitive assertion: If we reverse the sign of the literals in some default theory,
each extension of the original theory is the reverse of some extension of the new theory.
Theorem 3.7 (The Dual Theorem). Let W be a set of clauses and D a set of
disjunction-free defaults. Then E is an extension of (D,W) iff dual(E) is an extension
of (dual(D),dual(W)).
Proof. We first establish the following assertion.
Claim 3.8. For any set of clauses W , dual(W∗)= (dual(W))∗.
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Proof. Suppose W is a set of clauses, and M is the set of all models of W . Let dual(M)
be the dual set of M , that is the set of models obtained by taking each model in M and
reversing the truth value it gives to each atom. Clearly, dual(M) is the set of all models of
dual(W).
c ∈ dual(W∗) ⇒ dual(c) ∈W∗ ⇒ dual(c) is true in every model in M ⇒ c is true
in every model in dual(M) ⇒ c ∈ (dual(W))∗ (since dual(M) is the set of all models of
dual(W)).
For the other direction, c ∈ (dual(W))∗ ⇒ c is true in every model in dual(M) ⇒
dual(c) is true in every model in M ⇒ dual(c) ∈W∗ ⇒ c ∈ dual(W∗). ✷
We are now ready to continue the proof of the Dual Theorem. Assume E is an extension
of of (D,W). We will show that dual(E) is an extension of (dual(D),dual(W)). By
Definition 2.1, for some integer n > 1, E =En =En−1, where
(1) E0 =W , and
(2) for i  0 Ei+1 =E∗i ∪{l | α : β1, . . . , βk/ l ∈D where α ∈Ei and¬β1, . . . ,¬βk /∈E}.
and l is a literal (remember we assume that each conclusion is a single literal).
We take the same n, and prove that dual(E)=Gn =Gn−1, where
(1) G0 = dual(W), and
(2) for i  0 Gi+1 = G∗i ∪ {l | α : β1, . . . , βk/ l ∈ dual(D) where α ∈ Gi and ¬β1, . . . ,¬βk /∈ dual(E)}.
This will establish the claim that dual(E) is an extension of (dual(D),dual(W)).
We will make use of the following claim:
Claim 3.9. For every k  0, Gk = dual(Ek).
Proof. By induction on k.
Case k = 0: Obvious.
Case k > 0: dual(Ek) is equal to dual(E∗k−1) ∪ L, where L is a set of literals {dual(l) |
α : β1, . . . , βk/ l ∈ D where α ∈ Ek−1 and ¬β1, . . . ,¬βk /∈ E}. Clearly L
is equal to the set {l | α : β1, . . . , βk/ l ∈ dual(D) where α ∈ dual(Ek−1)
and ¬β1, . . . ,¬βk /∈ dual(E)}. By Claim 3.8 above, dual(E∗k−1) is equal to
(dual(Ek−1))∗ and so dual(Ek) = dual(E∗k−1) ∪ L = (dual(Ek−1))∗ ∪ {l | α :
β1, . . . , βk/ l ∈ dual(D) where α ∈ dual(Ek−1) and ¬β1, . . . ,¬βk /∈ dual(E)}.
By the induction hypothesis, dual(Ek−1)= Gk−1, and so dual(Ek) = G∗k−1 ∪{l | α : β1, . . . , βk/ l ∈ dual(D) where α ∈ Gk−1 and ¬β1, . . . ,¬βk /∈ dual(E)}.
Hence, dual(Ek)=Gk . ✷
By the above claim, Gn = dual(En) and Gn−1 = dual(En−1). Since E = En = En−1,
dual(E)= dual(En)= dual(En−1), and hence dual(E)=Gn =Gn−1. ✷
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The dual theorem yields the following new complexity classes for default logic.
Corollary 3.10 (Positive results on brave reasoning).
(1) (See item (2) in Corollary 3.3.) Suppose ∆ = (D,W) where W is a set of clauses
that belongs to a tractable subset and D is a set of dual-Horn rules ineffectual w.r.t.
W . We can determine in time polynomial in ∆ whether a given literal appears in any
extension of ∆.
(2) (Following [18], see item (4) of Section 2.2.) When W is a set of definite dual-Horn
clauses and D is a set of dual-Horn defaults, brave reasoning for negative literals can
be solved in polynomial time (the reasoning for positive literals is NP-complete).
(3) (Following [18], see item (5) of Section 2.2.) When W is a set of bi-Horn clauses and
D a set of dual-Horn defaults, brave reasoning for (negative and positive) literals can
be solved in polynomial time.
Corollary 3.11 (Positive results on cautious reasoning. See item (3) in Corollary 3.3.)
Suppose ∆= (D,W) where W is a set of clauses that belongs to a tractable subset, and D
is a set of normal dual-unary defaults ineffectual w.r.t. W . We can decide whether a literal
belongs to every extension of the theory in time polynomial in the length of ∆.
Corollary 3.12 (Negative results on brave reasoning).
(1) (Following [10], see item (1) in Section 2.3.) The problem of determining whether a
literal appears in some extension of a dual-unary default theory is NP-complete.
(2) (Following [16], see item (2) in Section 2.3.) The problem of determining whether a
literal appears in some extension of a default theory ∆= (D,W) where W is a set of
dual-Horn clauses and D is a set of prerequisite-free negative normal unary defaults
is NP-complete.
(3) (Following [16], see item (3) in Section 2.3.) The problem of determining whether a
literal appears in some extension of a default theory ∆= (D,W) where W is a set of
2-CNF clauses and D is a set of normal dual-unary defaults is NP-complete.
(4) (Following [16], see item (4) in Section 2.3.) The problem of determining whether a
literal appears in some extension of a default theory ∆ = (D,W) where W is a set
of 2-CNF clauses and D is a set of prerequisite-free ordered dual-unary defaults is
NP-complete.
(5) (Following [16], see item (5) in Section 2.3.) The problem of determining whether
a literal appears in some extension of a default theory ∆ = (D,W) where W is a
set of literals and D is a set of prerequisite-free ordered dual-unary defaults is NP-
complete.
(6) (Following [18], see item (6) in Section 2.3.) The problem of determining whether a
positive literal appears in some extension of a default theory∆= (D,W) where W is a
set of definite dual-Horn clauses and D is a set of dual-Horn defaults is NP-complete.
(7) (Following [18], see item (7) in Section 2.3.) The problem of determining whether a
literal appears in some extension of a default theory ∆= (D,W) where W is a set of
2-CNF dual-Horn clauses and D is a set of dual-Horn defaults is NP-complete.
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Corollary 3.13 (A negative result on cautious reasoning. Following [10], see Section 2.4.)
The problem of determining whether a literal appears in every extension of a default theory
where W is a set of unit clauses and D is dual-Horn is co-NP-complete.
Corollary 3.14 (A negative result on coherence. Following [10], see Section 2.5.) The
problem of determining whether a default theory (D,W) has an extension, where D is
dual-unary and W is a set of literals, is NP-complete.
3.1. Default theories and logic programs
Logic programming is a paradigmatic way of representing programs and data in a
declarative manner using symbolic logic. Originally, the language used by logic programs
was restricted to Horn clauses. However, its expressive power was greatly improved after
introducing negation into the body of the rules. This negation was generally interpreted
as “negation by default”, not classical negation, resulting in a grounded predicate being
considered false iff it cannot be proved from the program. For an overview of this field,
see [9].
One of the most prominent semantics for logic programs is stable model semantics [3,
5,7]. Gelfond and Lifschitz [7] have shown how stable model semantics can be naturally
generalized to the class of extended logic programs, which uses two types of negation—
classical negation and negation by default.
An extended logic program is a set of rules of the form
r← p1, . . . , pm,not q1, . . . ,not qn, (2)
where each of the r’s, p’s, and q’s are literals, and not is a negation-by-default operator.
The p’s are called prerequisites, and the q’s are called non-believed. r is called the head of
the rule, and p1, . . . , pm,not q1, . . . ,not qn—the body of the rule. Stable model semantics
associates a set of models, or answer sets, with such an extended logic program.
Gelfond and Lifschitz established a one-to-one correspondence between extended logic
programs and disjunction-free default theories by identifying a rule of the form (2) with
the default
p1 ∧ · · · ∧ pm : dual(q1), . . . ,dual(qn)
r
. (3)
Given an extended logic program rule r of the form (2), its twin default rule (3) will be
denoted by def (r). Given an extended logic program Π , def (Π) is the union of def (r)
for all r ∈ Π . Gelfond and Lifschitz have shown that each extension of a default theory
defined above corresponds to an answer set of its twin logic program. A similar idea was
introduced by Bidoit and Froidevaux [3].
Thus any algorithm that computes extensions of a default theory will also compute
answer sets of extended logic programs under stable model semantics. Hence, the
complexity results and tractable subsets shown in this paper are relevant for logic
programming as well.
Comment 3.15. The Gelfond and Lifschitz transformation from a logic program to a
default theory always yields a theory (D,W) where W is an empty set. According to that
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transformation, a rule with an empty body translates to a default which is not semi-normal.
This limits the applicability of the tractable subsets discovered above because most of
them require the logic program to correspond to a semi-normal default theory. We suggest
a slightly different transformation. Given a logic programΠ , we may map Π into a default
theory ∆Π = (D,W) as follows:
• D is the set of all rules of the form def(r) where r is a non-empty body rule in Π .
• W is the set of all literals l such that there is an empty body rule l← in Π .
For example, suppose Π is the following logic program:
Q ←
P ← Q,not ¬P
¬P ← Q,not P.
According to Gelfond and Lifschitz, the default theory which corresponds to Π is (D1,W1)
where W1 is empty and D1 = def (Π). D1 is not a set of semi-normal defaults because the
logic program rule “Q←” translates to “ true : true
Q
”. According to the slightly different
transformation that we suggest, the default theory which corresponds to Π is (D2,W2)
where
W2 = {Q} and
D2 =
{
Q : P
P
,
Q : ¬P
¬P
}
.
It can be easily seen that given a logic program Π , E is an extension of ∆Π if and only
if E is an extension of def (Π).
For the reader’s convenience, in the following we explicitly state the new complexity
results that this paper provides for extended logic programs.
We first give some definitions, most of which have analogous definitions for disjunction-
free default theories. Whenever we say “logic program”, or just “program”, we mean
“extended logic program”.
Definition 3.16 (Stratified logic programs). A stratified logic program is a logic program
where it is possible to partition the set S of literals in the program into subsets {S0, . . . , Sr },
called strata, such that for each rule δ of the form (2):
(1) the literal that appears in the head of δ belongs to some stratum Sc;
(2) the strata indexes associated with the prerequisite literals in the body of δ are not bigger
than c; and
(3) the strata indexes associated with the non-believed literals in the body of δ are strictly
smaller than c.
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It is known that stratified logic programs have at most one answer set that can be
computed in linear time [1,6]. Consequently, we can compute an extension of a disjunction-
free default theory (if it exists) that corresponds to a stratified logic program in linear time.
Ordered logic programs are logic programs that correspond to ordered default theories.
Since ordered default theories are semi-normal by definition, the corresponding logic
programs must have an analogous property.
Definition 3.17 (Ordered logic programs). A logic program Π is ordered if and only if
def (Π) is an ordered set of defaults.
In other words, a logic program is ordered if and only if the following two conditions
are satisfied:
(1) Every rule in the program is of the form
r← p1, . . . , pm,not dual(r),not q1, . . . ,not qn, (4)
that is, the dual of the literal in the head of each rule appears as a non-believed in the
body of the rule.
(2) The logic program Π ′, obtained by replacing each rule in Π of the form (4) by the
rule
r← p1, . . . , pm,not q1, . . . ,not qn,
is stratified.
The following example shows that the set of ordered logic programs intersects the set
of stratified logic programs but none of them is contained in the other.
Example 3.18. Consider the following three logic programs, Π0, Π1, and Π2.
Π0: P ←Q
Π1: P ←Q,not ¬P
¬P ←Q,not P
Π2: P ←¬Q,not ¬P
The program Π0 is stratified, but not ordered (the literal ¬P is not in the set of non-
believed of the single rule of the program). The program Π1 is ordered, but not stratified,
and the program Π2 is both ordered and stratified.
Definition 3.19 (Ordinary logic program). A logic program Π is ordinary2 if and only if
def (Π) is a normal set of defaults.
2 We have refrained from using the term “normal” here because “normal logic program” has acquired a
different meaning in the logic programming literature.
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In other words, a logic program is ordinary if each rule in the program is of the form
r← p1, . . . , pm,not dual(r).
That is, each rule has a single non-believed which is the dual of the literal in the head. For
example, Program Π1 of Example 3.18 is ordinary. Note that every ordinary logic program
is ordered.
Definition 3.20 (Smooth logic program). A logic program Π is smooth if and only if
def (Π) is a smooth set of defaults.
In other words, a logic program Π is smooth if and only if it has at least one of the
following properties:
(1) Whenever a literal is in the head some rule in Π , its dual is not in the head of any other
rule in Π .
(2) Whenever a literal is in the head of some rule in Π , its dual is not one of the
prerequisites of any other rule in Π .
Program Π1 of Example 3.18 is smooth. It does not have Property 1 of the above
definition but it does have Property 2.
Definition 3.21 (Dual-Horn logic program). A logic program Π is dual-Horn if and only
if def (Π) is a dual-Horn set of defaults.
That is, a programΠ is dual-Horn if and only if every rule in the program is of the form
r← p1, . . . , pm,not dual(r),
where p1, . . . , pm are negative literals and r is any literal. Note that every dual-Horn logic
program is ordinary.
Definition 3.22 (Dual-unary logic program). A logic program Π is dual-unary if and only
if def (Π) is a dual-unary set of defaults.
In other words, a program Π is dual-unary if every rule in the program has one of the
following two forms:
(1) r← p,not dual(r), where p is a negative literal and r is any literal.
(2) r← p,not dual(r),not q , where p and r are negative literals and q is a positive literal.
Definition 3.23 (Prerequisite-free logic program). A logic program Π is prerequisite-free
if and only if each rule in the program has no prerequisites.
We will now rephrase the results that were presented in the previous section which are
relevant for logic programs.
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Corollary 3.24 (See Theorem 3.5). Let l be a literal and let Π be a smooth ordinary logic
program. Then we can decide in time linear in the size of Π whether l belongs to at least
one of Π ’s answer sets.
Corollary 3.25 (Complexity results for dual-Horn logic programs).
(1) (See item (1) in Corollary 3.10.) Let Π be a dual-Horn logic program and l any literal.
We can decide in time polynomial in the size of Π whether l belongs to at least one of
Π ’s answer sets.
(2) (Following [10].) The problem of determining whether a literal belongs to every
answer set of a dual-Horn logic program is co-NP-complete.
Fig. 1. New complexity classes for the membership query. An arrow between classes indicates a subset
relationship.
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Corollary 3.26 (Complexity results for dual-unary logic programs).
(1) (Following [10].) The problem of determining whether a dual-unary logic program
has an answer set is NP-complete.
(2) (Following [10].) The problem of determining whether a literal belongs to at least one
answer set of a dual-unary logic program is NP-complete.
(3) (Following [16].) The problem of determining whether a literal belongs to at least one
answer set of a prerequisite-free ordered dual-unary logic program is NP-complete.
(4) (Following [10].) Let Π be an ordinary dual-unary logic program. We can decide in
time polynomial in the size of Π whether a given literal belongs to every answer set
of Π .
The above corollaries show there are three tractable subsets for reasoning with extended
logic programs. Membership (deciding whether a literal belongs to at least one answer set)
for the class of smooth ordinary logic programs and dual-Horn programs is tractable, and
entailment (deciding whether a literal belongs to every answer set) for ordinary dual-unary
logic programs is also easy.
Note that the class of ordinary dual-unary logic programs is strictly contained in the
class of dual-Horn logic programs. Indeed, although entailment for ordinary dual-unary
logic programs is tractable, it is co-NP-complete for the entire class of dual-Horn logic
programs.
All the tractable classes of logic programs mentioned above intersect each other. For
example, program Π2 of Example 3.18 is both ordinary smooth, ordinary dual-unary (and
hence dual-Horn), and stratified. However, for each of the three classes, ordinary smooth,
dual-Horn, and stratified, we can have a program that belongs to one class but does not
belong to any of the other two.
Fig. 2. New complexity classes for the entailment query.
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Fig. 3. New complexity classes for the coherence query.
The next program is dual-Horn, but is neither ordinary smooth, nor stratified, nor
ordinary dual-unary:
P ←¬Q,¬S,not ¬P
¬P ←¬R,¬S,not P
Q←¬P,¬S,not ¬Q
The program Π1 of Example 3.18 is ordinary smooth, but is neither dual-Horn, nor
stratified. The program Π0 of Example 3.18 is stratified, but is not ordinary and hence
is neither ordinary smooth nor dual-Horn.
4. Conclusion
We have identified several new subclasses of Reiter’s default logics and discussed the
complexity of coherence, membership and entailment problems in these classes. We have
shown the applicability of our results to logic programming. The illustrations in Figs. 1–3
are a summary of all the subsets identified in this paper. The Dual Theorem presented here
can be used in future works as a tool for classifying complexities of various subsets of
default logic.
All the tractable subsets identified in this paper can be recognized in linear time,
provided that the clauses in W belong to a tractable subset identified in linear time. This is
a useful feature since a general algorithm answering queries on default theories can quickly
test the input knowledge base for membership in tractable classes and thus can apply the
most efficient algorithm.
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